Abstract-This paper presents an approach to verifying complex free-flight algorithms. We give an abstract model that defines properties that a concrete implementation of a (distributed) free-flight algorithm has to maintain to guarantee conflict free movement of airplanes. We develop this model gradually by defining the emergent behavior of airplanes at a very abstract level and refine our definitions towards a more concrete model. In this process, we prove every refinement step to guarantee correctness of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In current air traffic control systems, airplanes are monitored by human controllers. To prevent collisions, the controllers advise new routes to the airplanes. The controllers rely on the spacing between established airways to maintain collisionfree air traffic. But this system has its flaws: inefficient use of airspace, probability of human errors during this process and non-optimal routes [6] . To solve those problems, the concept of free-flight separation assurance was developed [1] . This approach allows airplanes or their pilots to choose their route on their own.
Algorithms for calculating routes for airplanes in a freeflight setting have been developed over the past years, for example in [6] , [3] , [5] , [7] . In these papers the only tool that was used to verify correctness for an arbitrary number of airplanes is simulation. Like testing, while simulation can raise confidence in an algorithm, it cannot provide guarantees. As lives are at risk when using computer-aided collision avoidance for airplanes, much trust must be placed in such algorithms. Hence, we propose a formal approach to their verification.
We adopt the refinement-based approach of Smith and Sanders [9] for formally verifying that a self-organising system satisfies a global (emergent) behaviour. The idea is to start with an abstract specification in which the global behaviour is explicitly captured by a single event, and then to progressively refine that event towards a sequence of interactions of the system components. By definition, each step in the refinement process preserves the behaviour of the original abstract specification [2] . Hence, any implementation satisfying the interaction patterns of the final specification is guaranteed to exhibit the global behaviour.
The specification language we use in this paper is Z [10] . We introduce the proof obligations for refinement in Z in Section II. In Section III, we introduce a well established algorithm for free-flight separation by Eby [3] . In Section IV, we provide a series of refinements of an abstract model of free-flight separation. We show that Eby's algorithm does not refine the abstract model and cannot be guaranteed to maintain a minimum separation distance between airplanes. We also provide a modification of Eby's approach which can be proven to maintain separation. While we don't provide the implementation details of this approach, any implementation satisfying the specification will result in the desired global behaviour.
Other work in this area has looked at formally verifying free-flight separation algorithms at the implementation level [8] , [4] . This has been limited, however, to scenarios involving only two airplanes. Our approach provides verification of a more abstract model but does so for an arbitrary number of airplanes.
II. REFINEMENT
We use the Z notation [10] for our specifications in this paper. In the Z notation a concrete operation C is a refinement of an abstract operation A (denoted by A C) if the following conditions apply:
1) The precondition of C is equal to or more liberal than the precondition of A: pre A ⇒ pre C 2) The postcondition of C is equal to or stronger than the postcondition of A: pre A ∧ C ⇒ A This results in C being applicable whenever A is. Furthermore, C leads a system into a state of the state space that a system can take after an execution of A. Since nondeterminism may be reduced, the resulting state space of C may be smaller than the resulting state space of A.
III. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF FREE-FLIGHT ALGORITHMS
Eby [3] presents a free-flight separation approach based on treating airplanes as if they were charged particles. An airplane wields a repulsive force on other airplanes proportional to its distance from them. Applying this force in all cases has unwanted effects, so Eby only applies the force to airplanes which have detected a future conflict. This approach has been used by other researchers in the area including Hoekstra [6] . It consists of four steps which are continually repeated. 1) Detect conflicts 2) Calculate routes to avoid future conflicts 3) Fly along new routes for a short time 4) Restore routes to a straight line to the destination The routes calculated in the second step are based on summing up the repulsive forces of conflicting airplanes. For a conflict involving only two airplanes, this force causes the airplanes to fly routes which are tangential to the desired safety radius around each airplane. This minimises the deviation from the original route. While this approach has been proven to work for two airplanes [4] , it has only been simulated for more than two. The simulations show that the separation of airplanes by at least the safety radius is not always maintained [3] .
IV. FORMAL MODELS

A. Abstract view and emergence
We begin by introducing the abstract types AIRPLANE and POSITION.
[AIRPLANE, POSITION]
The airplanes in a particular airspace are denoted by the set airplanes and we define partial functions that return the origin (orig) and the destination (dest) of airplanes. The function d calculates the distance between two positions. r d is the radius around the destination of an airplane where we consider the airplane to be at its destination. This radius would generally be several kilometers around an airport, and corresponds to where an air-traffic controller would take over the separation assurance and coordinate landings and take offs.
In current requirements for safe air traffic, all airplanes must be separated by a certain distance. In our system, we define this safety zone as a circle around an airplane of radius r s , which is defined to be greater than zero.
On this level of abstraction only positions of airplanes change. To describe the current position of an airplane, we define the function pos, which returns this position. The domain of pos equals the domain of orig and dest, which is the set airplanes. This function is defined in the state schema Airspace so that its value can be changed by operations. In Z, the values of axiomatically defined variables (such as those above) cannot change. 
INIT1 Airspace pos = orig
The global (emergent) property of an airspace with independently maneuvering airplanes is that, given all airplanes do not start within the safety zone of another airplane, every airplane reaches its destination. This is defined by Event1, which will be refined throughout this paper. After Event1 is executed, each airplane is at its destination, or at maximum r d away from it. More precisely, the position of an airplane a after the execution of Event1 must be less than or equal to r d from its destination. Note that the value of variable pos after the execution of Event1 is denoted by pos . It is introduced into the operation schema along with pos by the notation ∆Airspace.
Stepwise movement Now we refine our abstract schema Airspace to consider conflicts of airplanes by introducing a relation in conflict. A conflict arises, if the distance between two airplanes is smaller than the safety radius. There is no conflict if both airplanes are within r d of their destinations, because then an air traffic controller assures conflict-free movement.
This airspace, and that in all subsequent refinements, is initialised as in INIT1.
We define a new schema Event2 that guarantees that there are no conflicts while moving airplanes stepwise. Furthermore, Event2 assures that the distance to the destination of every airplane after every execution is smaller than the distance before. This assures progress of the system by bringing each airplane closer to its destination.
Event2 ∆AirspaceSteps
Therefore, 
C. Routes
To reduce the level of abstraction further, we define routes for airplanes.
ROUTE == seq POSITION
We define a maximum velocity v max for airplanes and assume planes move for one time unit each step. Hence, v max is the maximum distance an airplane can travel in one step. To avoid airplanes 'jumping over' each other, r s has to be (much) greater than v max .
Now we can give a further refinement of the airspace by extending AirspaceSteps. We constrain the position of an airplane a to be at the beginning of its route (route(a)(1)) while the end of the route of the airplane (route(a)(#route(a))) is at its destination. Furthermore, a route must lead an airplane towards its destination by reducing the distance to it after every step. Finally, routes must not require airplanes to fly faster than the maximum speed.
No additional constraints are required to initialise routes. The invariant of AirspaceRoutes already assures that a route extends from the current position of an airplane to its destination.
To avoid conflicts, airplanes have to change their routes. The operation ChangeRoutes achieves this. Here we only guarantee that the next waypoint an airplane flies to is not in conflict with another airplane, since the resolution of a conflict may require many steps. The invariant that the distance to the destination decreases at each step rules out inappropriate algorithms where an infinite number of steps can be necessary to resolve a conflict [5] . ChangeRoutes does not need to consider airplanes that are already in conflict because our operations do not allow them to get into conflict as proved below.
ChangeRoutes ∆AirspaceRoutes
MoveAlongRoutes moves airplanes to their next position in their route and sets the new route to the tail of the original route. If an airplane has already reached the zone around its destination defined by r d , we only require that it remains within that zone.
MoveAlongRoutes ∆AirspaceRoutes
The sequential composition of the operations ChangeRoutes and MoveAlongRoutes will move each airplane towards its destination without conflicts occurring. Hence, we have a refinement of Event2.
Theorem 2: Event2 ChangeRoutes o 9 MoveAlongRoutes Proof: (1) The precondition has been weakened to true, so the proof for the preconditions is trivial.
(2) The invariant of the schema AirspaceRoutes assures that the route of each a : airplanes lead the airplane towards its destination:
Hence, MoveAlongRoutes moves airplanes towards their destinations:
Also when there are no existing conflicts, ChangeRoutes ensures the next position in the route is conflict-free and does not change the position of any airplane:
D. Eby's algorithm
A crucial part of Eby's approach is the detection of conflicts. We therefore define a relation between airplanes that captures whether they will enter into a conflict. We extend AirspaceRoutes by adding this relation.
AirspaceEby AirspaceRoutes conflict detected : airplanes ↔ airplanes
In order to detect conflicts, airplanes look ahead by a certain amount of time. An airplane must not move further in one step than the radius defined by its look ahead time.
We can now specify an operation for detecting conflicts.
DetectConflicts ∆AirspaceEby
To model the algorithm of Eby [3] , we define the function restore which abstractly models a function that calculates a route on a straight line between two positions.
restore : POSITION × POSITION → ROUTE
We now define an operation that applies this function to the routes of all airplanes while not changing anything else. avoidance route will be calculated as in Hoekstra's algorithm [6] . Now we can model Eby's algorithm for conflict resolution by providing a replacement for ChangeRoutes. ChangeRoutesEby composes the required operations sequentially.
Avoid It turns out that ChangeRoutesEby is not a refinement of ChangeRoutes. This is because airplanes that are rerouted are only guaranteed not to conflict with airplanes with which they detected a conflict. This leads to a problem, as shown in the Figures 1(a) and 1(b) . Airplanes A and B are rerouted because they detected a conflict with each other. Airplane A changed its route and will now move on without considering airplane C. This behaviour can lead to a conflict whenever the distance between two airplanes is smaller than r s + 2 * v max . Hence, the high-level specification is not met: an airplane can violate the safety radius of another airplane.
This does not contradict the results of Eby whose simulations show such violations are possible. He argues that this only occurs in dense airspaces and that the degradation in separation between aircraft is gradual. However, he cannot guarantee that collisions cannot occur.
E. An improved approach
To solve the problems mentioned in the previous section, we define an extended safety radius r e such that airplanes cannot get into conflict in one step when outside this extended safety zone. When two airplanes are travelling towards each other at maximum speed, they must not enter the safety zone of each other. Hence, r e extends the safety radius by 2 * v max . To use the extended safety radius, we refine AirspaceRoutes introducing the relation at risk between airplanes. Airplanes are in that relation, if they are not in conflict, but in the extended safety radius of each other.
AirspaceExtended AirspaceEby at risk : airplanes ↔ airplanes
We adopt the operations MoveAlongRoutes and Restore from the previous sections with the addition that those operations do not change the set at risk. When detecting conflicts, we use the extended safety radius. Furthermore, we change the relation at risk so that airplanes are in that relation if the distance between their current positions is lower than the extended safety radius and greater or equal to the safety radius. To avoid conflicts, airplanes now calculate avoidance routes outside the extended safety radius of airplanes with which they have detected a conflict. The first part of the operation AvoidAndEvade below guarantees this.
Of course, an airplane can still enter the extended safety zone of another airplane. Hence, we specify an additional part of the operation for such airplanes. An implementation of the operation has to assure that once an airplane is in the extended safety radius -that is, when it is in the domain of at riskthen it does not move closer to the other airplane, which is modeled in the second part of AvoidAndEvade.
The rest of the schema ensures that nothing else is changed.
AvoidAndEvade ∆AirspaceExtended ∀ a, a c : airplanes \ dom at risk • (a, a c ) ∈ conflict detected ⇒ d(route (a)(2), route (a c )(2)) ≥ r e ∀ a, a c : airplanes • (a, a c ) ∈ at risk ⇒ d(route (a c )(2), route (a)(2)) ≥ d(pos(a c ), pos(a)) ∀ a : airplanes \ dom(at risk ∪ conflict detected) • route (a) = route(a) pos = pos ∧ conflict detected = conflict detected ∧ at risk = at risk
We compose the operations as follows.
